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From Decriminalisation to Marriage:  Changing Judicial, Political and 
Religious Attitudes in the United Kingdom to Gay and Lesbian Fami-
lies 
 
by 
Kenneth McK. Norrie, 
University of Strathclyde, 
Scotland 
 
 
Introduction 
In 2012, the year that Denmark openeds marriage to same-sex couples, and 
as this paper is being written, the legal systems of the United Kingdom are 
moving closer towards the removal of the existing limitation on marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.  This chapter will explore the remarkable cultural and 
legal change that has allowed, within barely more than a single generation, 
gay men and lesbians to move from their previous position of criminality, 
immorality and social exclusion to one of protected and legitimate full citi-
zenry.  The embracing of a human rights perspective in legal culture at the 
turn of the 21st Century  is one of the important elements in explaining why 
this revolution of social and political attitudes has come about but it is not, 
as we will see, the only one and a shift of attitudes was clearly evident be-
fore then.  This paper will also examine the attitudes of mainstream religion 
in the United Kingdom to modern legal norms that require non-
discrimination principles to be extended to gay men and lesbians, and to 
same-sex couples.  For it is organised religion that is, in 2012, providing the 
main focus of opposition to governmental plans to extend marriage to same-
sex couples.  Before doing so, however, it is as well to remind ourselves 
that, unlike most other vulnerable groups who have suffered centuries and 
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even millennia of discrimination and social exclusion, gay men (in particu-
lar) faced the ultimate legal sanction of criminality for living their lives ac-
cording to their own nature. 
 
The Importance of Decriminalisation 
The acceptance that Mr Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court is 
right on a matter of sexual orientation jurisprudence does not come easily to 
legal commentators who support sexual orientation equality and non-
discrimination.  Even more difficult to accept is that he was right in Law-
rence v. Texas1 when he dissented from the decision of the Supreme Court 
that struck down, as contrary to the US Constitution, the criminalisation of 
male-male sexual activity.  Yet right he was, if in his reasoning though not 
his conclusion.  ³7RGD\¶VRSLQLRQ´KHVWDWHVZLWKLQVLJKW³LVWKHSURGXFWRI
a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely 
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda 
promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral 
RSSUREULXP WKDW KDV WUDGLWLRQDOO\ DWWDFKHG WR KRPRVH[XDO FRQGXFW´2  The 
decision of the majority, to strike down all anti-sodomy laws in the US,  
³GLVPDQWOHVWKHVWUXFWXUHRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZWKDWKDVSHUPitted 
a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual 
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. 
,IPRUDOGLVDSSUREDWLRQRIKRPRVH[XDOFRQGXFWLVµQROHJLWLPDWH
VWDWHLQWHUHVW¶IRUSXUSRVHVRISURVFULELQJWKDWFRQGXFW«ZKat 
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of 
PDUULDJH WR KRPRVH[XDO FRXSOHV H[HUFLVLQJ µ>W@KH OLEHUW\ SUo-
WHFWHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶"«7KH&RXUWWRGD\SUHWHQGVWKDW«
 
1 (2003) 539 US 558. 
2 (2003) 539 US at p. 602. 
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we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as 
has recently ocFXUUHGLQ&DQDGD«'RQRWEHOLHYHLW´3 
 
Though his motives were malign, his point is undeniable.  Criminalisation 
of same-sex sexual activity, in a society that no longer unquestioningly 
takes its moral guidance from religious texts, provides the only sustainable 
firewall against claims for equality and non-discrimination, and removing 
that firewall therefore exposes discriminatory laws to the harsh spotlight of 
rationality.  Moral disapprobation may well have virtually disappeared from 
judicial and political discourse in the UK (as elsewhere), but the fear of 
crime, as a subversion of society itself, remains and politicians continue to 
feel able to cast criminals in the role of other, of outsider, of wrongdoers 
who do not deserve the civic entitlements that full members of society take 
for granted.4  Removing criminality as well as moral disapprobation from 
same-sex sexual conduct becomes not only the start of the process towards 
equality and non-discrimination but is also the catalyst that, sooner or later, 
makes relationship recognition, as the ultimate expression of civic entitle-
ment, inevitable.5 
 
Changing Social Attitudes 
It is not the purpose of this paper to identify whether legal developments 
have driven changes in social attitudes towards gay men and lesbians and to 
same-sex relationships or whether, instead, it is changing social attitudes 
that have created an environment in which legal changes can be effected.  
 
3 Ibid. 
4 As shown by the political furore that followed the EuURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶GHFi-
VLRQWKDWWKH8.¶VEODQNHWEDQRQSULVRQHUVIURPYRWLQJLQHOHFWLRQVZDVDQLQIULQJHPHQWRI
Protocol 1, art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Hirst v. United Kingdom 
(2006) 42 EHRR 411 and, particularly, Greens v. United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 21.  
6HHIRUH[DPSOH³'DYLG&DPHURQ%DFNV3ULVRQ5HEHOV´The Telegraph February 10, 2011. 
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The two have, in all likelihood, gone hand in hand, the one feeding off, sup-
porting and encouraging, the other.  Legal developments will be discussed 
in detail later, but the change in social attitudes towards homosexuality has 
been traced by the British Social Attitudes Survey since 2000.6  This shows 
a continuous fall in the number of people in the United Kingdom who con-
sider same-sex relationships to be always or mostly wrong (48% in Scotland 
and 46% in England in 2000; 40% in both Scotland and England in 2005; 
and 27% in Scotland and 29% in England in 2010), together with a concom-
itant rise in the number of those who consider same-sex relationships to be 
not wrong at all (29% in Scotland and 34% in England in 2000; 35% in 
Scotland and 37% in England in 2005; and 50% in Scotland and 44% in 
England in 2010).  The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 20107 breaks the 
Scottish figures down in terms of gender, age and attendance at religious 
services.8  Unsurprisingly there is a significant age disparity and the natural 
demographics of population replacement can only serve to speed the rate of 
increase of the acceptability in (or indifference to) homosexuality.  46% of 
those over 55 held the view in 2010 that same-sex relationships are always 
or mostly wrong, but only 19% of those aged between 35 and 54 did so, 
falling to 13% for those aged between 18 and 34.  57% of those who attend 
a religious service at least once a week considered same-sex relationships to 
be always or mostly wrong; but only 24% of those who attend religious ser-
vices at least once a month did so.  These figures had fallen from 64% and 
48% respectively in 2005. 
 
                                                                                                                        
5 $SRLQWPDGHE\.:DDOGLMN³&LYLO'HYHORSPHQWV3DWWHUQVRI5HIRUPLQWKH/HJDO3RVi-
tion of Same-6H[3DUWQHUVLQ(XURSH´ 17 Rev. Can. Dr. Fam. 62 at p. 86. 
6 See 28th British Social Attitudes Report, National Centre for Social Research, 2010, Table 
2.6. 
7 Published by the Scottish Government at www.scotland.gov.uk/socialresearch . 
8 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2010, Table 7.3. 
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It is implausible to imagine that this fall since the beginning of the 21st Cen-
tury in the number of people opposed to same-sex relationships began only 
when these Surveys first asked the question in 2000, and it is likely that the 
trend started rather earlier, as decriminalisation removed an important inhi-
bition on gay men and lesbians living openly.9  Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s gay men and lesbians became much more visible in the community, 
in the mass media, and even in politics.10  This increased visibility helped to 
lessen the fear of the unknown11 (homophobia, properly, being fear of rather 
than hatred towards, homosexuals12).  The very normality of gay people, 
and their lives and relationships, helped to remove the preconception that 
gay people were deliberately seeking to subvert social and ethical norms,13 
and this allowed an environment to develop in which law- and policy-
makers felt able, and then obliged, to extend equality imperatives to gay 
men and lesbians, and to same-sex couples. 
 
Changing Judicial Attitudes 
 
9 An opinion poll reported in The Economist March 3, 2012, traces the fall in disapproval of 
same-sex relationships to 1990, after a sharp increase in the mid-1980s, explained, the article 
suggests, by the HIV-AIDS panic at that period. 
10 It was a major news story in 1984 when Chris Smith MP became the first member of the 
British House of Commons to openly admit that he was gay (becoming, in 1997, the first 
openly gay minister in a British Cabinet).  By 2010, the fact that the winning candidate, 
Ruth Davidson, MSP, to become the Leader of the Conservative Party in Scotland was a 
lesbian was barely worth mentioning in the press. 
11 The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2010 (n.7 above) shows (Table 7.5) that people who 
personally know a gay man or lesbian are around twice as likely to support same-sex mar-
riage as people who do not themselves know any gay or lesbian people. 
12 )URP³SKRELD´GHILQHGLQWKHShorter Oxford English Dictionary DV³$IHDUDKRUURU
(an) aversion: esp. an abnormal and irrational fear or dread aroused by a particular object or 
FLUFXPVWDQFH´ 
13 See further M. McCormack, The Declining Significance of Homophobia (Oxford, OUP, 
2012). 
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Decriminalisation of male-male sexual conduct occurred at different points 
throughout the United Kingdom,14 with England and Wales leading the way 
in 1967,15 Scotland following in 1980,16 and Northern Ireland being (with 
deep reluctance) required to follow suit two years later17 after the European 
Court of Human Rights decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom18.  It was 
not to be expected that the lives of gay men and lesbians (most of whom 
were never charged with any criminal offence) would change immediately 
on decriminalisation, and for some years thereafter social attitudes to homo-
sexuality remained profoundly negative and served to ensure a continuing 
reluctance on the part of gay men and lesbians to live their lives openly and 
honestly.  These social attitudes were reflected in the attitudes of judges 
who, when gay men or lesbians came to their attention (even beyond the 
confines of the criminal law), treated them with suspicion at best and con-
tempt at worst.  In, for example, R v. Bishop,19 eight years after decriminali-
sation in England and Wales, a witness in a trial for burglary was revealed 
to be a homosexual and the legal question this gave rise to was whether it 
would have any effect on his credibility as a witness.  The Court of Appeal 
KHOGWKDWWKHZLWQHVV¶VKRPRVH[XDOLW\EHLQJDPDWWHUWKDWLQGLFDWHGLPPR
rality, did indeed compromise the reliability of the witness.  A person such 
 
14 Though it is as well to note that decriminalisation was only partial, with a variety of pro-
visions making criminal acts which, had they been heterosexual in nature, would be legally 
innocuous, such as advertising or soliciting for sex. Another difference was that decriminali-
sation did not extend to members of the armed services, who remained subject to court mar-
WLDOIRUDQ\³KRPRVH[XDORIIHQFH´VHHIRUH[DPSOHSecretary of State for Defence v. Warn 
[1970] AC 394. The most noticeable difference, however, concerned the age of consent, 
which was originally 21 (as opposed to 16 for non-gay sex); after being reduced to 18 in 
1994 the age of consent became 16 with the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000.  Sex-
ual orientation neutrality in criminal law was achieved in England and Wales by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 and in Scotland by the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. 
15 Sexual Offences Act 1967, s. 1. 
16 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, s. 80. 
17 Homosexual Offences (Nothern Ireland) Order 1982. 
18 (1981) 3 EHRR 40, (1982) 3 EHRR 149. 
19 [1975] QB 274. 
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DV WKDW ZDV PRUH OLNHO\ WKDQ WKH ³QRUPDO´ SHUVRQ WR WHOO OLHV Dnd even to 
commit the criminal offence of perjury.  A similarly attitude is shown in the 
child adoption case of 5H ' $Q ,QIDQW $GRSWLRQ 3DUHQW¶V &RQVHQW,20 
ZKHUHWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVKHOGWKDWDIDWKHU¶VFRQVHQWWRWKHDGRSWLRQRIKLV
child could be dispensed with because, as a homosexual, he had nothing to 
offer the child.21  7KHIDWKHU¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKHFRXUW¶VYLHZZDVQRWOLNHO\
to be other than harmful: a reasonable father would do all he could to pro-
tect his son from contact with homosexuals.22  It was pointed out23 that Par-
OLDPHQW LQ  KDG RQO\ SDUWLDOO\ GHFULPLQDOLVHG ³PDOH KRPRVH[XDOLVP´
and could not therefore be said to have taken a morally neutral view of that 
phenomenon. That homosexual conduct remained immoral, in the eyes of 
the law, even after decriminalisation is seen again in a case in which a 
newspaper that carried advertisements in its personal columns for men to 
meet other men, potentially for sexual purposes, was convicted of conspira-
cy to corrupt public morals and conspiracy to outrage public decency.24 
 
The issue arose with far sharper focus in the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
the courts were required to assess the impact of sexuality on the welfare of 
FKLOGUHQ LQ WKHFRQWH[WRIFKLOGFXVWRG\GLVSXWHV $W WKLV WLPHDPRWKHU¶V
lesbianism was treated as a strongly negative factor in her claim to custody 
of her child.  In Re P (A Minor) (Custody)25 the Court of Appeal in England 
UHMHFWHGDIDWKHU¶VFODLPWKDWKLVFKLOGUHQFXrrently living with their mother, 
 
20 [1977] AC 602. 
21 Per Lord Simon of Glaisdale at p. 639 and Lord Kilbrandon at p. 642. It passed without 
comment in the case that the mother had obtained a divorce against the father on the basis of 
WKHODWWHU¶V³FUXHOW\´ZKLFKZDVFRQVWLWXWHGE\KLVKRPRVH[XDOLW\ 
22 Per Lord Wilberforce at p. 628. 
23 Per Lord Simon of Glaisdale at p. 637. 
24 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1973] AC 435 (House of Lords).  This is not surprising since sexual acts between males 
that fall short of the penetration needed to constitute the act of sodomy (buggery, in English 
ODZZHUHOHJDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHGDV³JURVVLQGHFHQF\EHWZHHQPDOHV´ 
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should be removed from her and placed in public care because the mother 
was a lesbian, but the Court expressed concern about the dangers to the 
FKLOGSRVHGE\WKHPRWKHU¶VOLIHVW\OHDOORZLQJFKLOGUHQWROLYH³LQSUR[LPLW\
WRVH[XDOGHYLDQFH´ WKH\VDLGFRXOG³RQO\EHFRXQWHQDQFHGEy the courts 
ZKHQLWLVGULYHQWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQ´WKDWWKHUHZDVQRDFFHSWDEOHDOWHUQDWLYH
(LJKW \HDUV ODWHU WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ RI ³GHYLDQFH´ KDG EHHQ GURSSHG EXW LW
ZDVVWLOODVVXPHGWKDWDSDUHQW¶VKRPRVH[XDOLW\ZDVDVWURQJO\QHJDWLYHIDc-
tor in a child custody dispute.  In B v. B26 custody was awarded to the lesbi-
an mother after the judge examined the literature and found no evidence that 
children brought up by such mothers suffered harm, yet even in light of that 
lack of evidence the judge felt obliged to assert that it was important to dis-
tinguish between, on the one hand, lesbians like the mother in the present 
FDVH³ZKRZHUHSULYDWHSHUVRQVZKRGLGQRWEHOLHYHLQDGYHUWLVLQJWKHLUOHs-
ELDQLVP´DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQG³PLOLWDQWOHVELDQVZKRWULHGWRFRQYert oth-
HUV WR WKHLUZD\RI OLIH´ +RPRVH[XDOLW\ZDVDFFHSWDEOH WR WKH MXGJHEXW
only if it was discreet and conforming, and there was no better option.  In 
Early v. Early27 the Scottish court removed an eight year old child from his 
mother who had always looked after him when she entered into a relation-
ship with another woman, and transferred custody to the father with whom 
he had never stayed and who had two convictions for child neglect in re-
spect of his other children.  In C v. C28 the judge at first instance had award-
ed custody of the child to the mother but was overruled by the English 
Court of Appeal for giving wholly inadequate weight to the fact that she had 
entered into a lesbian relationship. 
 
                                                                                                                        
25 [1983] 4 FLR 401. 
26 [1991] 1 FLR 402. 
27 1989 SLT 114; 1990 SLT 221. 
28 [1991] 1 FLR 223. 
Sidehoved 
 9 
In most of these cases, as it happens, the mothers were able to retain custody 
of their children, which may indicate that the rhetoric of societal disapproval 
will readily give way to the judicial recognition of reality that children 
thrive in a stable and loving environment even when that environment fails 
to PHHWVRFLHW\¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH³LGeDO´± as, in truth, most families do, to 
some extent.  A thawing in judicial attitudes is evident in R v. Gray,29 which 
FRQFHUQHGDFRQYLFWLRQIRU³LPSRUWXQLQJ´ 7KH&RXUWRI$SSHDOKHOG WKDW
whether an invitation to eQJDJH LQ KRPRVH[XDO FRQGXFW ZDV ³DQ LPPRUDO
SXUSRVH´ZDV DTXHVWLRQ IRU WKH MXU\ WR DQVZHUGHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH FLUFXm-
stances rather than a question of law that always demanded a positive an-
swer.  And in 5H ' $Q ,QIDQW $GRSWLRQ 3DUHQW¶V &RQVHQW,30 already 
considered, Lord Kilbrandon was at pains to emphasise that the decision 
laid down no rule of law that homosexuals could never offer their children 
anything.31 
 
The gradual softening of social attitudes to homosexuality throughout the 
1980s and 1990s is given concrete expression in the watershed decision for 
judicial attitudes, T, Petitioner.32  In this Scottish case a gay man sought to 
adopt the child he had been looking after for some years.  He had a male 
 
29 (1982) 74 Cr. App. Rep. 324. 
30 [1977] AC 602. 
31 ³,t could easily be productive of injustice if one were to attempt any hard and fast rule as 
to the attitude which the courts ought to adopt, in custody, access or adoption matters, 
towards those whose sexual abnormalities have denied them the possibility of a normal 
family life. This is because it is not possible to generalise about homosexuals, or fair to treat 
them as other than personalities demanding the assessment appropriate to their several 
individualities in exactly the same way as each heterosexual member of society must be 
regarded as a person, not as a member of a class or herd. Naturally, in a family law context, 
the fact of homosexual conduct cannot be ignored, but no more can the consequences of 
taking it into account be standardised. The kind of influence, in this type of problem, which 
the fact may have will be infinitely variable´per Lord Kilbrandon at pp. 641-642. 
32 6/7)RUFRPPHQWVRQWKLVFDVHVHH.1RUULH³3DUHQWDO3ULGH$GRSWLRQDQG
WKH*D\0DQ´6/71HZV05RVV³$WWLWXGHVWR6H[XDO2ULHQWDWLRQLQ$GRp-
WLRQ/DZ´(GLQ/5 
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partner, and the judge at first instance, Lord Gill, refused the adoption order 
(which was, in fact, being opposed by no-one) on the ground that there was 
a fundamental question of principle as to whether the law permitted an 
adoption order to be made in favour of a man living in an admittedly homo-
sexual relationship with another man.  On appeal, however, the Inner House 
of the Court of Session overturned this decision holding, dismissively, that 
there was no such question of principle.  The matter turned solely on the 
best interests of the child and it was open to anyone who objected to the 
adoption to bring evidence to the court to show that living with this appli-
cant would be harmful to this child.  But it was simply not open to a court, 
exercising a proper judicial discretion, to start off with a negative precon-
ception about the dangers of homosexuality. A judge must base his decision 
strictly on the evidence that is put before him, and what he must not GR³LV
to permit his own personal views, or his own private beliefs, to affect his 
MXGJPHQW´7KH(QJOLVh court made a similar decision soon afterwards.33 
 
It is of some significance that this change in judicial attitudes was first evi-
denced in cases involving children, where there tends to be the strongest po-
litical resistance to accepting the moral neutrality of sexual orientation.34  
The decision in Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association,35 a case of fun-
damental importance, was perhaps made easier by the fact that it did not in-
volve children.  Here the House of Lords was faced with the question of 
whether a same-VH[FRXSOHFRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVD³IDPLO\´IRUWKHSXUSRVHV
of succession to a tenancy.  The same question had been raised and 
answered negatively, both by the domestic court and at Strasbourg, some 
 
33 Re W (Adoption: Homosexual Adopter) [1997] 2 FLR 406. 
34 Parenting rights are frequently excluded from civil partnership legislation (see n.63 be-
low) ± though they were not from the UK legislation. 
35 [1999] 4 All ER 707. 
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fifteen years previously.36  By a narrow, 3-2 majority, the House of Lords 
held that such a couple could indeed, for statutory purposes, come within 
WKHFRQFHSWRI³IDPLO\´2QFHLWKDGEHHQDFFHSWHGWKDWDIDPLO\FRXOGLn-
clude a couple who were not married, there was no rational basis upon 
which a limitation of the concept to opposite-sex couples could be imposed.  
Though the immediate significance of the case was its extension of a partic-
ular, and statutorily limited, right to same-sex couples, its importance is far 
more profound for it shows that, even before the coming into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the judges in the highest court in the United King-
dom were analysing a claim of right in terms of rational justification for 
limiting the right at issue to one sexual orientation rather than another.37 
 
Two months after Fitzpatrick the European Court of Human Rights held, for 
the first time, that sexual orientation discrimination came within the ambit 
of article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights,38 and within a 
very few years had declared that where states attempt to differentiate treat-
PHQWRILQGLYLGXDOVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUVH[XDORULHQWDWLRQ³WKHUHLVDQHHGIRU
particularO\ FRQYLQFLQJ DQG ZHLJKW\ UHDVRQV WR MXVWLI\´ VXFK GLIIHUHQFH39  
7KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWQRZVWUHVVHVWKDW³GLVFULPLQDWLRQ based on sexual ori-
HQWDWLRQ LV DV VHULRXV DV GLVFULPLQDWLRQEDVHGRQ UDFH RULJLQ RU FRORXU´40  
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000, and the strong statu-
tory instruction that that Act gave British courts to interpret and apply all 
 
36 Simpson v. Harrogate Borough Council (1984) 17 Housing Law Rep. 205; S v. United 
Kingdom (1986) 47 D & R 274. 
37 It was more than ten years after Fitzpatrick before the European Court of Human Rights 
finally accepted that same-VH[FRXSOHVFRXOGFODLP³IDPLO\OLIH´DVSURWHFWHGE\$UWRIWKH
European Convention: Schalk v. Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20. 
38 Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (2001) 31 EHRR 47. 
39 Karner v. Austria (2004) 38 EHRR 24 at para. 37 (raising exactly the same issue as faced 
the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick).  See also EB v. France (2008) 47 EHRR 509 at para. 91; 
Kozak v. Poland (2010) 51 EHRR 16 at para. 92. 
40 Vejdeland v. Sweden (App. 1813/07) 9th February 2012, at para. 55. 
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legal rules in a way that is consistent with the ECHR and Strasbourg juris-
prudence had immediate effect.41  The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not 
only accepted, but embraced, by the judiciary.  Lord Walker may be found 
LQVD\LQJ³WKHHQDFWPHQWRIWKH$FWZas possible only because of 
the profound cultural change which has occurred in most of Europe, within 
the last two generations, in attitudes towards homosexuality.  Many people 
(and not only homosexuals) would say that that change has taken far too 
long, aQGWKH\ZRXOGEHULJKW´42  Lord Hope, a few years afterwards, dep-
UHFDWHVWKH³UDPSDQWKRPRSKRELFWHDFKLQJWKDWULJKW-wing churches indulge 
in throughout much of sub-6DKDUDQ $IULFD´43 in a case that involved a 
claim for asylum made by a gay man whose life would be in danger in his 
own country.  The Supreme Court rejected (with some contempt, it may be 
noted) the argument of the immigration authorities that he could avoid the 
risk of harm by hiding his sexuality and living his life discreetly:44 this less 
than 20 years after the English courts were requiring of lesbian mothers 
such discretion if they wished to retain custody of their own children. 
 
Changing Political Attitudes 
Responding to the same social changes in attitudes to homosexuality as the 
courts, the UK Parliament has similarly shifted from one of outright hostili-
ty towards, to one of embrasure of, gay men and lesbians and of same-sex 
 
41 Fitzpatrick had refused to go as far as to hold that a same-VH[FRXSOHZHUH³OLYLQJWogeth-
HUDVKXVEDQGDQGZLIH´± the formulation used in a large number of UK statutes granting 
rights and responsibilities to unmarried couples ± but as a direct result of the non-
discrimination requirements in the ECHR the House of Lords reversed that position only 
five years later and held that any statute that gave benefits or imposed obligations on unmar-
ried couples now had to be interpreted, in light of the Human Rights Act 2008, in a way that 
would include same-sex couples: Ghaidan v. Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557. 
42 M v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11 at para. 92. 
43 HJ and HT v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 at para. 21. 
44 An argument that had already been rejected by the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (UNHCR, 2008) at paras. 25-26. 
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relationships.  It started badly.  Only one year before Denmark introduced 
the world to the concept of a legally created status, separate from marriage, 
for same-sex couples,45 the UK Parliament deliberately expressed profound 
antipathy towards such relationships by passing legislation of doubtful 
JUDPPDUEXWFOHDUPDOLJQLQWHQWSURKLELWLQJWKHSURPRWLRQRIWKH³DFFHSta-
bLOLW\RIKRPRVH[XDOLW\DVDSUHWHQGHGIDPLO\UHODWLRQVKLS´46  This legisla-
tion was a reaction to what a majority in Parliament at that time regarded as 
an unwelcome social development: the palpable lessening of the social hos-
tility faced by gay men and lesbians, and the encouraging of children to be 
tolerant of different ways of life.  It is in the context of an increasing ac-
ceptance of homosexuality, an increasing understanding that gay men and 
lesbians were not deliberately choosing to subvert social norms but instead 
simply living their lives according to their own natures, that the passing of 
³VHFWLRQ´LVWREHXQGHUVWRRG7KDWSURYLVLRQZDVLQWHQGHGDVDUHSODFe-
ment to the firewall protecting against relationship recognition that decrimi-
nalisation had removed: its aim was a Parliamentary attempt to counter the 
growing belief in the moral equivalence between gay and straight, same-sex 
relationships and opposite-sex relationships.  Rather pleasingly, it had ex-
actly the opposite effect since the passing RI³VHFWLRQ´SURYHGDFDWDO\VW
for gay rights activists: its very malignity attracted friends to the gay-rights 
movement from across the political spectrum. 
 
It is not, however, surprising that little legislative progress was made while 
the Conservative *RYHUQPHQW UHVSRQVLEOH IRU ³VHFWLRQ ´ UHPDLQHG LQ
power but that, and everything else, changed in 1997 when the Labour Gov-
ernment took over.  Within a year, the Human Rights Act 1998 had been 
 
45 'HQPDUN¶V$FWRQ5HJLVWHUHG3DUWQHUVKLSZDVHQDFWHGRQth June 1989. 
46 Local Government Act 1988, s. 28, inserting s.2A into the Local Government Act 1986. I 
H[SORUHWKHOHJDOPHDQLQJOHVVQHVVRIWKLVSURYLVLRQLQ³6\PEROLFDQG0HDQLQJOHVV/HJLVOa-
WLRQ´Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 310. 
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passed, together with a constitutional restructuring of the United Kingdom 
itself with the establishment of devolved legislatures in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales.  The Scottish Parliament may lay claim to be the first 
legislature within the United Kingdom that enacted legislation that, in deal-
ing with family relationships, deliberately included same-sex couples to the 
same extent as opposite-sex couples,47 and since then the statutory impera-
tive for all the UK legislatures has been to do so, without discrimination.  
³6HFWLRQ´ZDVUepealed by the Scottish Parliament in 200048 and by the 
UK Parliament in 2003.49  7KURXJKRXW WKH /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW¶V WLPH LQ
power (1997 ± 2010) political hostility to same-sex relationships became 
confined to the far right and even the party responVLEOHIRU³VHFWLRQ´WKH
Conservative Party, did not oppose the civil partnership legislation in 2004 
and, since 2010 in coalition government with the Liberal Democrats (long 
supporters of equality legislation), have promoted an equality agenda that 
moves beyond civil partnership for same-sex couples. 
 
Relationship equality within family law was further advanced when same-
sex couples were given parity with opposite-sex couples in the new adop-
tion legislation which removed the restriction on couple adoptions to mar-
ried couples.50  The extenVLRQRIFRKDELWDQWV¶ULJKWVLQ6FRWODQGQRWUHSOi-
cated elsewhere in the United Kingdom) embraced same-sex couples.51 And 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, which applies through-
 
47 The Adults with Incapacityies 6FRWODQG $FW  V  GHILQHV ³QHDUHVW UHODWLYH´
within the mental health legislation to include members of conjugal same-sex couples. 
48 Ethical Standards in Public Life (Scotland) Act 2000, s. 34. 
49 Local Government Act 2003, Sched. 8 Pt 1. 
50 See the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 144(4) (for England and Wales) and the 
Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s. 29 (for Scotland).  For Northern Ireland, see 
Re P (A Child) (Adoption: Unmarried Couples) [2008] UKHL 38. 
51 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 which not only created new rights (and liabilities) for 
both types of couple but also extended all existing rights (and liabilities) to same-sex cou-
ples. 
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out the United Kingdom, replaced its 1990 predecessor and removed the 
provision that allowed clinics and hospitals to limit their services to married 
women and heterosexual couples.52  It also extended the definition of 
parenthood, in circumstances when artificial reproductive technology had 
been used, to include same-sex couples: now a child may have a mother and 
anRWKHU ³SDUHQW´ZKR LV WKH VDPH VH[ DV WKH PRWKHU53 and parental orders 
(conferring parenthood by order of the court) can be granted to couples of 
any gender mix after a surrogacy arrangement has been given effect to.54 
 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 
These legislative developments, important as they are, did nothing more 
than equate same-sex couples with opposite-sex unmarried couples. The 
ability to access the universal rights and responsibilities available to oppo-
site-sex couples through the institution of marriage came with the passing, 
again without significant political opposition, of the Civil Partnership Act 
2004.  Opposition came mainly from religious bodies, who have long 
claimed to have a special voice in relation to the institution of marriage, and 
the 2004 Act was deliberately designed in a way that it was hoped would 
neutralise opposition from that source.  So for example it excluded opposite-
sex couples, to prevent civil partnership from being seen as a secular alter-
native to marriage.55  Instead, its aim was to provide a means by which all 
the rights and responsibilities currently available to opposite-sex couples 
 
52 This was the aim (though in truth not the legal effect) of s.13(5) of the Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act 1990 which originally required providers to take account of the 
need of the child for a father.  This was amended in 2008 to read that account had to be tak-
en of the need of the child for supportive parenting. 
53 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, ss. 42-47. 
54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, ss. 54-55. 
55 There are long and tedious rules designed to ensure that this gender mix is not affected by 
the fact that one of the parties changes sex, something finally permitted in UK law only 
months before the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was passed, with the Gender Recognition Act 
2004. 
Header 
 16 
through the institution of marriage could become available to same-sex cou-
ples through an equivalent, but quite distinct, institution.  For the same rea-
son, civil partnership was deliberately designed to be an entirely secular in-
stitution which could not be brought into existence, as marriage can, 
through religious ceremony.  Only a state official, the district registrar, is 
able to bring a civil partnership into existence by registration.  Also, as orig-
inally passed for all three jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, it was ex-
plicitly forbidden to use places that are (or were in the past) used solely or 
mainly for religious purposes.56 These rules remain as originally enacted in 
Scotland and in Northern Ireland, but were amended for England and Wales 
when the Equality Act 2010 allowed for the approval of religious premises 
in which civil partnership registrations may take place, so long as the reli-
gious body that owns or controls the premises wishes.57 For England and 
Wales, at least, the complete secularity of civil partnership has been broken, 
though there remain rules against the participation of religious officials in 
the registration process. 
 
The other major difference between marriage and civil partnership is that 
there is no sex in civil partnership.  Marriage remains, at least to some ex-
tent, a sexual relationship, that is to say one in which it is expected that the 
SDUWLHV¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLOOEHVH[XDODQGZLWKLQZKLFKVH[XDOQRUPVZLOOEH
enforced.  This perception of marriage is explained by its religious history.  
Most Christian religions have long seen marriage as the sole legitimation of 
the sexual act, and the modern law of marriage in all parts of the United 
Kingdom still retains vestiges of this sacramental view of marriage.  So for 
example the canon law crime of adultery ± sexual intercourse by a married 
 
56 Civil Partnership Act 2004, section 6, as originally passed (England and Wales), section 
93 (Scotland), section 144 (Northern Ireland). 
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person with someone he or she is not married to ± is deemed to constitute 
the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and so provide a ground for di-
vorce.58  This is not, however, a ground for dissolving a civil partnership, 
though all the other (non-sexual) grounds for divorce are replicated as 
grounds for dissolving a civil partnership.  Another manifestation of the im-
portance of the sexual act within marriage is seen in the still extant rules re-
lating to consummation and impotency.  In England and Wales a marriage is 
voidable (that is to say can be annulled and treated as if it never had been) if 
it is not consummated;59 in Scotland a marriage is voidable if one or other 
of the parties is, at the date of the marriage, incurably impotent (that is to 
say unable to consummate the marriage).60  Neither of these rules was repli-
cated for same-sex couples in the civil partnership legislation.61 
 
However, other than these peculiarities concerning the creation of a civil 
partnership, which serve to differentiate the concept from marriage ± and 
isolate civil partnership from the sphere of religion ± the actual consequenc-
es of both relationships, once created, are virtually identical.  It is for this 
                                                                                                                        
57 Equality Act 2010, s. 202, given effect to by Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved 
Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011/2661, which came into force on 5th December 
2011. 
58 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 1(2)(a); Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s. 1(2)(a) (Eng-
land and Wales). 
59 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s. 12(a) (inability to consummate) and (b) (wilful refusal 
to do so).  Consummation of marriage is constituted by full penile penetration of the vagina 
at some point after the parties have been declared to be husband and wife.  If this never oc-
curs, then the marriage may be declared null by a court of law.  The Roman Catholic Church 
will also treat the marriage as if it had never been, so providing Roman Catholics with a 
means oIHVFDSLQJIURPDQXQVDWLVIDFWRU\PDUULDJHZLWKRXWFDOOLQJLW³GLYRUFH´ 
60 In Scotland this is a common law rule that has never found its way into statute. 
61 An interesting practical consequence of removing sex from the relationship is provided 
from Ireland where similarly civil partnership is entirely asexual.  It has been reported that 
two elderly women, both heterosexual, entered a civil partnership with each other so that 
RQH FRXOG LQKHULW WKH RWKHU¶V SURSHUW\ ZLWKRXW SD\LQJ GHDWK GXWLHV  7KLV FRXOG QRt be 
DFKLHYHGE\PDUULDJHDVWKHODFNRIFRQMXJDOLQWHQWLRQZRXOGUHQGHUWKHPDUULDJHD³VKDP´
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reason that civil partnership in the United Kingdom might legitimately 
FODLPWREH³PDUULDJHLQDOOEXWQDPH´62  There are fewer distinctions made 
in UK law between marriage and civil partnership than in most other juris-
dictions that have introduced a marriage-equivalent as the means of achiev-
ing gay and lesbian equality in family law.63  It follows that any human 
rights challenge on the basis that same-sex couples are being discriminated 
against by not being able to marry has less chance of success in the United 
Kingdom than in many other European countries where the limitation of 
same-sex couples to a distinct but equivalent regime limits them to a regime 
with less rights, obligations and liabilities than opposite-sex couples who 
can access marriage.64  
 
Continuing Religious Opposition 
                                                                                                                        
marriage.  See report at www.jillkerby.ie/blog/sundaytimes_moneycomment (5th February 
2012). 
62 6HH IRU H[DPSOH1%DPIRUWK³7KH%HQHILWVRI0DUULDJH LQ$OOEXW1DPH"6DPH-Sex 
&RXSOHVDQGWKH&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FW´&)/47KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
Human Rights, in Burden v. United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38 at para. 65 equiperated 
civil partnership with marriage and distinguished them both from unregistered cohabitation: 
³7KHUHFDQEHQRDQDORJ\EHWZHHQPDUULHGDQG&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FWFRXSOHVRQWKHRQH
hand, and heterosexual and homosexual couples who choose to live together but not to be-
FRPHKXVEDQGDQGZLIHRUFLYLOSDUWQHUVRQWKHRWKHU´ 
63 Parenting of children by gay and lesbian people is usually the issue that legislatures draw 
the line at: even Denmark, when it first introduced registered partnerships for same-sex cou-
ples in 1989, excluded the parenting of children and an effect and that exclusion remains in 
many countries that have introduced civil partnership legislation.  See, most recently, the 
5HSXEOLFRI,UHODQG¶V&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLSDQG&HUWDLQ5LJKWVDQG2EOLJDWLRQVRf Cohabitants 
Act 2010, which excludes civil partners from jointly adopting a child or holding joint guard-
ianship in relation to a child. 
64 In Wilkinson v. Kitzinger [2006] 2 FLR 397 a female couple who had married in Canada 
sought to have their relationship recognised in England as a marriage (rather than as a civil 
partnership, the 2004 Act converting all overseas formalised relationships involving same-
sex couples into civil partnerships) but they failed because the judge saw no practical dis-
tinction other than the name between the two institutions.  Implicit in his judgment is that 
there is no human right to call the relationship one thing rather than another.  See R. Auch-
PXW\³:KDW¶V6R6SHFLDO$ERXW0DUULDJH"7KH,PSDFWRI:LONLQVRQY.LW]LQJHU´ (2008) 
20 CFLQ 475. 
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Society in generalas a whole and lawmakers ± whether judges or legislators 
± have thus seemed to embrace the moral neutrality of sexual orientation.  
Not so religion.  Religion remains, in the words of Kay Goodall,65 ³WKHRQO\
powerful current ethical framework in Western states which holds sexual 
orientation to be a relevant factor by which to make fundamental judgments 
DERXWWKHZRUWKRILQGLYLGXDOV´5HOLJLRXVRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHOHJDOUHFRJQi-
tion and regulation of same-sex couples has become much more muted 
since the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was passed, though the mainstream re-
ligions in the United Kingdom continue to struggle to find the correct re-
sponse to the profound changes in society that the Act represents.66  Few 
churches actively seek the repeal of the 2004 Act, but only a very few small 
denominations are willing to embrace its terms.  The Church of England has 
since 2005 (when the 2004 Act came into force) prohibited its priests from 
granting blessings to civil partners67 and it reinforced that message when 
civil partnership registrations became possible in religious places, by pro-
hibiting the use of Church of England premises for that purpose.68  That 
church continues to suffer bitter divisions about the possibility of gay priests 
becoming bishops,69 at the same time (and not accidentally) as it suffers vir-
tually identical divisions at the idea of women bishops.70  The Church of 
Scotland was deeply split in 2011 on the question of whether members of 
 
65 ³&KDOOHQJLQJ +DWH 6SHHFK ,QFLWHPHQW WR +DWUHG RQ *URXQGV RI 6H[XDO 2ULHQWDWLRQ LQ
(QJODQG:DOHVDQG1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG´,QW-+5DWSS-216. 
66 6HH-5LYHUV³/DZ5HOLJLRQDQG*HQGHU(TXDOLW\´(FF/-who, at pp. 33-
WUDFHVWKHVWUXJJOHWKDWUHOLJLRQVKDYHKDGLQWKHIDFHRIZKDWKHFDOOVPRGHUQVRFLHW\¶V
PRUH³SODVWLF´FRQFHSWLRQRIJHQGHU 
67 House of Bishops, Pastoral Statement 25th July 2005. 
68 Church of England General Synod (GS Misc 1005) 2nd December 2011. 
69 6HH ³$UFKELVKRS RI &DQWHUEXU\ )DFHV 'HIHDW RQ *D\ 'HDO´ The Telegraph March 3, 
2012, reporting the rejection of a proposal to prohibit openly gay priests from becoming 
bishops. 
70 It is as well to remember here that, the Church of England being the established (state) 
church, its 26 most senior bishops are guaranteed a seat in the House of Lords: the result is 
that even today 26 seats in the UK legislature are reserved for males who are (or claim to be) 
heterosexual. 
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civil partnerships (ie non-celebate gay people) could be ministers of the 
church and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland voted (not un-
typically) to postpone making a decision on the subject until 2013.71  The 
Roman Catholic Church does not suffer (in public, at any rate) the same di-
visions, being unquestioningly opposed to any legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships.  While preaching tolerance towards gay and lesbian individu-
als, it remains appalled at the very idea of gay sex,72 and it has been at the 
forefront of the opposiWLRQ LQ6FRWODQGWR WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VSODQV
to open marriage to same-sex couples.73  To be fair to that church, however, 
its disapproval of gay sex should be seen within the context of its more gen-
eral disapproval of any sexual act other than the potentially procreative.  Its 
continuing opposition to the use of contraception is traced to the same ide-
ology that sees sexual acts as justified solely by the role that they play in the 
creation of human life.  Limiting access to birth control has, of course, a 
disproportionate effect on women, who overwhelmingly bear the costs (both 
physical and economic) of procreation.  Thus it is that denying the legitima-
cy of any form of non-procreative sex is the basis both for discrimination 
against gay people and for the weltanschaung that relegates women to a 
secondary role of service providers for the male polity.74  Gay people and 
women have a common cause against the religious traditionalism embodied 
in current Roman Catholic (and indeed Anglican) church doctrine. 
 
 
71 Report of the Special Commission on Same-Sex Relationships and the Ministry (Report to 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, May 2011). 
72 The Cathecism of the Roman Catholic Church at 2359 demands that gay and lesbian peo-
SOHDFFHSWWKDWWKH\DUH³FDOOHGWRDOLIHRIFKDVWLW\´ 
73 See Sunday Telegraph 0DUFKLQZKLFK&DUGLQDO2¶%ULHQD6FRWWLVK$UFKELVKRS
DQGWKHPRVWVHQLRU&DWKROLFFOHULFLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPGHVFULEHGWKHSODQVDV³DJUo-
WHVTXHVXEYHUVLRQRIDXQLYHUVDOO\DFFHSWHGKXPDQULJKW´DQGVRPHZKDWEHmusingly) lik-
ened the proposal to allow same-sex couples to marry to a proposal to legalise slavery. 
74 6HH IXUWKHU $ 6WXDUW ³)UHHGRP RI 5HOLJLRQ DQG*HQGHU (TXDOLW\ ,QFOXVLYH RU ([FOu-
VLYH"´+5/5HY 
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While institutional religion has sought to influence the political debate, in-
dividual religious believers have sought to challenge particular applications 
of the equality norms that the 2004 Act most effectively represents.  In do-
ing so they raise starkly the question of the extent to which religion and re-
ligious believers can be exempted from secular laws that contradict their be-
liefs.75  Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which at-
tempts to strike a balance between non-discrimination and religious freedom 
by guaranteeing an unqualified right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, but allowing any manifestation of religion or belief to be subjected 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democrat-
ic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, has proved 
to be of very little help to those who seek to manifest their religious beliefs 
by treating gay men and lesbians, and same-sex relationships, differently 
from (inevitable, less well than) non-gay people and opposite-sex couples.76 
 
In Ladele v. Islington Borough Council77 the claimant, who was a district 
registrar, asked her employers to exempt her from having to register civil 
SDUWQHUVKLSV VLQFH DV ³DQ RUWKRGR[ &KULVWLDQ´ VKH UHJDUGHG FLYLO SDUWQHr-
ship as an attack on (opposite-sex) marriage, which was the only form of 
sexual relationship sanctioned by her god.  When this request was refused, 
she sued her employers on the ground that they had discriminated against 
her because of her religious beliefs.  The claim was rejected by the Court of 
Appeal.  It was her refusal to do a part of her job and not her religious be-
 
75 This question is examined more broadl\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDQXPEHURIOHJDOV\VWHPV¶Dp-
SURDFKWRJHQGHUHTXDOLW\E\)5DGD\³&XOWXUH5HOLJLRQDQG*HQGHU´,QW-&RQ
Law 633. Her conclusion that women always lose out when cultural or religious norms are 
applied by courts in preference to human rights or equality norms is hardly surprising and 
sounds a clear warning for gay and lesbian people. 
76 See L. Vickers Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Hart 
Publishing, 2008). 
77 >@ :/5   6HH $ +DPEOHU ³A No-Win Situation for Public Officials with 
)DLWK&RQYLFWLRQV´(FF/- 
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liefs that was the reason for her dismissal: anyone would have been dis-
missed for that reason whether their motivation was religious or otherwise.  
She could not be allowed to give effect to her religious beliefs when this 
would be contrary to the policies and practices of her employers, who were 
legally bound to provide a public service without discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation. 
The same result was reached in McFarlane v. Relate (Avon) Ltd78 where an 
employee of a company that provided relationship counselling services was 
dismissed for refusing to provide these services to same-sex couples.  The 
case is eloquent in its defence of secularism as the correct ± indeed only le-
gitimate ± approach to judicial reasoning.  It rejected out of hand the notion 
that individuals can claim exemption from the general law based solely on 
their religious beliefs.  Laws LJ said this: 
³7KH FRQIHUPHQW RI DQ\ OHJDO SURWHFWLRQ RU SUHIHUHQFH XSRQ D
particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it 
is espoused by the adherents to a particular faith, however long 
its tradition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled.  It 
imposes compulsory law, not to advance the general good on 
objective grounds, but to give effect to the force of subjective 
opinLRQ´79   
 
78 [2010] IRLR 872. 
79 At para. [23]. The European Court on Human Rights heardis due, on September 4, 2012, 
to hear arguments in applications made by Ms Ladele and Mr McFarlane that the results in 
the UK courts meant that domestic law had failed adequately to protect their rights to mani-
fest their religious beliefs, contrary to Art. 9 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunc-
tion with Art. 14: see Ladele and McFarlane v. United Kingdom App. Nos 51671/10 and 
36516/10. 
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The Court of Appeal returned to the issue in Bull and Bull v. Hall and 
Preddy80 where hoteliers were held to have acted unlawfully in refusing a 
same-sex couple a double room in their hotel.  They had argued that, fol-
lowing an orthodox Christian belief that sexual relations were legitimate on-
ly within the context of marriage, they were entitled to insist that only mar-
ried couples be allowed double rooms in their hotel for to do otherwise 
would require them WREH FRPSOLFLW LQ WKH ³SURPRWLRQRI VLQ´  7KHFRXUW
had little difficulty in holding that, since opposite-sex couples were able to 
marry while same-sex couples were not, the effect of putting into practice a 
belief that only married couples could legitimately have sexual relations was 
to discriminate against same-sex couples and was therefore unlawful.81  Ar-
ticle 9(1) of the European Convention provided no defence, since Article 
9(2) allowed the state to prevent the hoteliers from manifesting their reli-
gious beliefs in the moral superiority of heterosexuality over homosexuality 
by refusing a double room to a same-sex couple, because such a limitation 
was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of same-sex couples not to be discriminated against.  
 
The result in all these cases was relatively easy for the courts to reach.  The 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 was so deliberately structured to differentiate 
FLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSIURPPDUULDJHWKDWWKHODZ\HU¶VDQVZHUWR0V/DGHOH (for 
example) was easy: civil partnership has nothing to do with marriage but is 
a secular means by which the state effects the legal regulation of some cou-
ples, so her objection that it attacked marriage was simply mistaken.82  
 
80 [2012] EWCA Civ. 83, [2012] 2 All ER 1017. See also Black v. Wilkinson (County 
Court, Reading, October 18, 2012).. 
81 Under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (now replaced by the 
Equality Act 2010). 
82 Another argument, of course, is that since there is such disagreement amongst Christians 
DV WR KRZ WKH\ VKRXOG UHJDUG KRPRVH[XDOLW\ WKHUH ZDV LQ IDFW QR ³UHTXLUHPHQW´ RI 0V
/DGHOH¶VIDLWKWRGLVFULPLQDWHDJDLQVWVDPH-sex couples.  In R (Playfoot) v. Millais School 
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/LNHZLVHWKHODZ\HU¶VDQVZer to the hoteliers in Bull and Bull v. Hall and 
Preddy was easy ± SURYLGLQJDFFHVV WRDGRXEOHURRPGRHVQRW³SURPRWH´
sin.83  But these answers do not address the real complaint of such religious 
traditionalists, which is the message of tolerance and moral equivalence that 
the Civil Partnership Act so powerfully represents.  The state is saying loud 
and clear what religious traditionalists vehemently deny: that gay and lesbi-
an people are no longer to be seen as morally inferior to heterosexual peo-
ple.  The ³PRUDO GLVDSSUREDWLRQ´ WKDW 6FDOLD - ZDQWHG WKH 86 6XSUHPH
Court to preserve is officially and comprehensively rejected in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The battle, in truth, is between secularism and faith, between universally 
applicable law and religiously mandated personal law, but this is a battle 
that, in western Europe at least, was lost long ago.  All the legal systems in 
the developed western world are based, more or less, on the Enlightenment 
principles of secular democracy.84  One of the most important practical con-
sequences of that ± so self-evident that it seldom requires to be explicitly 
stated ± is that courts operate through a system of testing evidence, not only 
of facts but of propositions.  No moral conclusion is today accepted axio-
matically and any stated proposition will gain judicial credence only by be-
ing justified either by factual evidence or by human rationality.  Since at 
                                                                                                                        
Governing Body [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) the court held that a school rule banning the 
wearing of rings did not interfere with the religious freedom of a pupil who wished to wear a 
ring to symbolise her commitment to pre-marital purity: there was no religious requirement 
to wear such a ring which was therefore a matter of personal choice, merely influenced by 
religious considerations and so not covered by Article 9. 
83 -XVWDVDQXUVH¶VVXSHUYLVLRQRIDODERXUZDUGLVQRWWKHLQYROYHment of that nurse in the 
termination of pregnancy carried out on patients in that ward: Doogan and Woods, Petition-
ers [2012] CSOH 32, where ward supervisors were held not entitled to claim the conscien-
WLRXVREMHFWLRQWRWKH³SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´LQWKHWHUPLQDWion of pregnancy provided for in s.4(1) 
RIWKH8.¶V$ERUWLRQ$FW 
84 6HH$6DMR³3UHOLPLQDULHVWRD&RQFHSWRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6HFXODULVP´,QW-&RQ
Law 605. 
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least the Human Rights Act 1998, all UK legislation has been subject to ju-
dicial oversight of its (secular) rationality.85  Religions, on the other hand, 
ZRUNTXLWHGLIIHUHQWO\DQGDW OHDVWZLWK WKH$EUDKDPLFUHOLJLRQV RU³UHOL
gLRQVRIWKHERRN´86), operate through revelatory texts.87  Religious reason-
LQJVWDUWVIURP³WKHWUXWK´EHLQJWKHUHYHDOHGZRUGRI*RGDVUHFRUGHGLQ
immutable texts, and human propositions and moral judgments are deduced 
from the text.  Different strands of each religion give more or less flexibility 
in interpreting these texts, but it is a definitional feature of religious belief 
that the text itself is the foundation of any moral position and cannot itself 
be challenged.  This is the very reverse of the secular rationalism applied by 
courts of law where truth is the end point, the rationally deduced conclusion 
from evidence or reasoning against which all propositions of social good are 
tested.88  There is no longer any legal assumption, traced to a foundational 
text (such as a law criminalising gay sex), that gay people are less worthy of 
respect than non-gay people. Secular rationalism would have no problem in 
allowing differential treatment if social evidence showed that gay people do 
in fact constitute some risk to society.  It was the realisation that such social 
evidence simply does not exist that has persuaded most western countries to 
reject their previous assumptions about the social and moral inferiority of 
gay and lesbian people.  Religious traditionalists, however, by adhering to 
revelatory truths, reject the need for social evidence and rely instead on di-
 
85 Baroness Hale, in Ghaidan v. Mendoza >@8.+/DWSDUDWDONHGRI³WKHUa-
tional behaviour we now [since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998] expect 
RI JRYHUQPHQW DQG WKH VWDWH´ DGGLQJ ³,I GLVWLQFWLRQV DUH WR EH GUDZQ SDUWLFXODUO\ RQ D
group basis, it is an important discipline to look for a rational basis for tKRVHGLVWLQFWLRQV´ 
86 That is to say Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
87 6HH)5DGD\³&XOWXUH5HOLJLRQDQG*HQGHU´,QW-&RQ/DZ 
88 I explore this clash between the secular rationalism of modern jurisprudence and what I 
call the ³UHYHODWRU\UDWLRQDOLVP´of theology PRUHIXOO\LQ³$FFRPPRGDWLQJ5HOLJLRQWRWKH
*D\(TXDOLW\,PSHUDWLYHLQ)DPLO\/DZ´LQ-0DLUDQG(2UXFXHGVThe Place of Reli-
gion in Family Law: A Comparative Search (Intersentia, 2011). 
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vine text for their moral guidDQFH³:HZDONE\IDLWKQRWE\VLJKW´89 is the 
crucial, definitional, characteristic of religious belief, but it is a proposition 
that any court of law (at least one operating within the parameters of secular 
rationalism) is bound to reject.  To do otherwise would allow any individual 
to claim exemption from any legal rule on the basis solely of their own reli-
gious or philosophical conviction that they ought not to be subjected to that 
rule.  Law, however, enforced through the police power of the state, must 
apply to everyone, whether they agree with it or not.  That is, quite simply, 
WKHGHILQLWLRQRI³ODZ´ 
 
The Coming of Marriage 
This battle between secularism and faith as the guiding principle for legal 
development has now moved to the political stage and religious traditional-
ists hope to find it easier to persuade politicians than judges that the law 
should continue to reflect moral propositions traced ultimately to religious 
texts.  The mainstream religions in the UK have long claimed a special 
voice in the way family life is regulated by the law and, in 2012, they are 
united in their opposition to changes to one family law concept ± marriage ± 
that is claimed to be, though a legal concept, one that is of uniquely reli-
gious import.90  Both the Scottish Government91 and the British Govern-
ment92 (representing England and Wales) have issued public consultations 
on the question of opening marriage to same-sex couples.  Though the de-
 
89 II Corinthians 5:7. 
90 Indeed marriage is a concept that both defines and differentiates various Christian tradi-
tions.  Changes to marriage laws ± and in particular the introduction of divorce ± was char-
acteristically one of the first manifestations of the legal effects of the Reformation: see J. 
:LWWH³&KXUFK6WDWHDQG0DUULDJH)RXU(DUO\0RGHUQ3URWHVWDQW0RGHOV´2[-
Law and Rel. 151. 
91 The Registration of Civil Partnerships: Same-Sex Marriage: A Consultation, Scottish 
Government, Edinburgh 2011. 
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tails of each consultation differ,93 both are responses to claims from gay 
rights supporters that, the content of marriage and civil partnership being (in 
WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPYLUWXDOO\LGHQWLFDOWKHZLWKKROGLQJRIWKHQDPH³PDr-
ULDJH´IURPVDPH-sex couples achieves nothing other than to deny them the 
dignity and respectability that (it is said) is uniquely conferred by the status 
of marriage.  This profoundly secularist argument persuaded the United 
6WDWHV &RXUWRI $SSHDOV IRU WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW WR VWULNHGRZQ³3URSRVLWLRQ
(LJKW´94 which was a constitutional amendment, approved by plebiscite in 
2008, that removed the right of same-sex couples in California to marry.95  
The court based its conclusion on the fact that Californian law (like UK 
law) granted to same-sex couples all the substantive rights of married cou-
ples through the institution of domestic partnership and that the only effect 
RI3URSRVLWLRQ(LJKWZDVWRUHPRYHWKHQDPH³PDUULDJH´IURPVDPH-sex re-
ODWLRQVKLSV  7KRXJK WKLV LPSRVHG QR VXEVWDQWLYH OHJDO ORVV LW VHUYHG ³WR
lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and 
to officially reclassify their relationships and families as inferior to those of 
opposite-sex couSOHV´96  As such, the court held that Proposition Eight was 
unconstitutional since it achieved no legitimate state purpose.  It is this 
                                                                                                                        
92 Equal Civil Marriage: A Consultation, Government Equalities Office, March 2012. 
93 The Anglo-Welsh consultation wais limited to civil marriage while the Scottish consulta-
tion includeds both religious marriage and religious civil partnership.  The Anglo-Welsh 
consultation disclaimeds any need to amend civil partnership in any way at all and so ex-
cludes from consideration the question of whether to open civil partnership to opposite-sex 
couples, while the Scottish consultation askeds whether there would be any need to retain 
civil partnership at all if marriage were opened to same-sex couples.  The Scottish Govern-
ment is, however, more cautious, asking whether to open marriage, while the UK Govern-
ment is more explicit that this will happen and so asks how best to achieve the opening of 
marriage announced on September 4, 2012 that it would include a bill to open marriage to 
same-sex couples in its 2012-13 legislative programme and it published its bill on XX De-
cember 2012.  The British Government is likely to follow a similar timetable: see ³*D\0Dr-
ULDJH&RXOGEH$SSURYHGZLWKLQ:HHNV´Telegraph November 23, 2012. 
94 Perry and Ors v. Brown 671 F 3d 1052February 7, (2012). 
95 Such couples having been granted that right by judicial decision less than a year previous-
ly: In Re the Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal 4th 757. 
96 Perry v. Brown at p. 5. 
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thinking that OLHVEHKLQGERWK WKH6FRWWLVKDQG WKH8.*RYHUQPHQWV¶SUo-
posals.   
The responses of the mainstream churches in the United Kingdom have 
been uniformly negative.  Both governments took pains to emphasise that 
no religious organisation will be forced to conduct marriage ceremonies that 
are contrary to their own doctrinal beliefs ± and indeed the English pro-
posals areconsultation is limited to civil marriage that has no religious 
case ± thus allowing the Church of England to avoid an internal debate on 
the issue similar to the destructive debates it continues to have in relation to 
women bishops97.  This makes it very difficult for the churches to oppose 
WKH*RYHUQPHQWV¶SODQVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLUGRFWULQDOEHOLHIVVLQFHWRHP
body these beliefs in law would be to impose their own beliefs on other re-
ligious bodies (and, through the state, everyone else itself) who do not hold 
beliefs ± which is the very thing that the mainstream churches want to avoid 
happening to themselves. 
It is for this reason that the main argument being propounded by the church-
es opposing the opening of marriage to same-sex couples is that it is simply 
not open to any religion or state authority to alter the existing and long-
standing definition of marriage.98  This argument is ostensibly based on the 
assertion that marriage as an opposite-sex relationship is either a natural 
 
97 On November 20, 2012, the General Synod (governing body) of the Church of England 
once again rejected proposals to allow women to become bishopsVHH³:RPHQ%LVKRSV$
)DLOXUHRI/HDGHUVKLS´Telegraph November 23, 2012. 
98 This argument is made both by the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church: 
see the comments of the Archbishop of York (the second most senior cleric in the Church of 
England) in an interview published on January 27, 2012 in the Daily Telegraph, and of Car-
GLQDO2¶%ULHQWKHPRVWVHQLRU8.FOHULFLQWKH5RPDQ&DWKROLF&KXUFKLQDQDUWLFOHSXb-
lished in the Sunday Telegraph on March 4, 2012. See also the Archbishop RI*ODVJRZ¶V 
³6WDWHPHQWRQ0DUULDJH´LQZKLFKKHVHWRXWWKH5RPDQ&DWKROLF&KXUFK¶VUesponse to the 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V&RQVXOWDWLRQ 
 www.scottishcatholicmediaoffice.org.uk/articles/archbishop-mario-conte-issues-statement-
on-marriage.html 
Formatted: English (United Kingdom)
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phenomenon or a divinely-created institution ± in either case a rule of man-
kind cannot overturn a rule of nature or of God.99  In truth, however, this is 
an argument about who has power to change marriage rules, not whether 
anyone can do so at all.  Legal systems have frequently moved away from 
those rules of marriage, traced to religious texts, that no longer serve the 
needs of society ± and many religious bodies have felt able to alter their un-
derstandings of scripture to accommodate these changes.  The most obvious 
example in recent times in the United Kingdom is the Marriage (Prohibited 
Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986 which removed many of the prohibitions 
on (non-blood) relatives marrying each other that were traced to the Book of 
Leviticus.100  7KH³GHILQLWLRQ´DUJXPHQWIDLOVWRJUDVS± indeed denies ± that 
marriage has become today a legal institution through which the state identi-
fies who is entitled to certain rights and subjected to certain obligations.  
This is not to say that marriage may not also be regarded as a religious sac-
rament, or that the state (as opposed to religious authorities) may well have 
no capacaity to amend the definition of any religious sacrament which is, 
necessarily, a self-defined idea.  But in its manifestation as a legal institu-
tion, regulated in the United Kingdom by the Marriage Act 1949 (for Eng-
land and Wales), the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003101 (for North-
ern Ireland) and the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 (for Scotland), marriage 
is as open to legislative change and development as (for example) is the age 
of majority.  Any religious body remains free to set different parameters to 
 
 99 Of course, in Roman Catholic theology traced to the writings of St Thomas Aquinas (par-
ticularly Summa Theologiae), divine law is QDWXUDOODZVHH³7KH1DWXUDO/DZ7UDGLWLRQLQ
(WKLFV´LQStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7KHVHQVHRIXVLQJ³QDWXUH´DVWKH
GHWHUPLQDQWRIPRUDOJRRG LVFRPSUHKHQVLYHO\ UHMHFWHGE\.*RRGDOO LQ³Human Rights 
3LWWHG$JDLQVW0DQ,,$5HVSRQVH´,QW-+5DWSS-1182. 
100 2WKHUVKDGSUHYLRXVO\EHHQUHPRYHGE\VWDWXWHVVXFKDVWKH'HFHDVHG:LIH¶V6LVWHU¶V
0DUULDJH$FWDQGWKH'HFHDVHG%URWKHU¶V:LGRZ¶V0DUULDJH$FWERWK of which 
are limited to England and Wales where particular biblical injunctions had been accepted): 
see S. Cretney Family Law in the 20th Century: A History (Oxford, OUP 2004) at pp. 48-57. 
101 S.I. 2003 No. 413. 
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its religious institution FXUUHQWO\ DOVR FDOOHG ³PDrULDJH´ GLIIHUHQW IURP
those applying to the legal institution and in fact there are numerous in-
stances of such bodies having done so.  The Roman Catholic Church, for 
example, defines marriage as a religious sacrament and therefore as an in-
dissoluble union.  But the indissolubility of marriage in the eyes of that 
Church has no effect in law and does not deny access to the divorce courts 
to those who married according to Roman Catholic rites or who even now 
adhere to the Roman Catholic faith.  The Church of England (in many re-
spects the Church of Rome without the Pope) refuses to marry in church 
ceremonies people who have been divorced and whose (ex)-spouses still 
live,102 but such people remain entirely free to marry in law, either by civil 
ceremony or in a church that has fewer qualms about divorce.103  Faith and 
its incidents may well affect the behaviour and lifestyles of individual peo-
ple who choose to adhere to a particular religious group, but law and its in-
cidents apply ± by definition ± to everyone.  Churches that deny the distinc-
tion between the religious sacrament of marriage and the legal institution of 
marriage are asserting a power over the state, and this is not a power that a 
modern secular state can ever concede. 
A more subtle ± but also more dangerous ± variation of the definition argu-
ment is that marriage is necessarily and by definition a reflection of the es-
sential complementarity between men and women.  There is a long theolog-
ical tradition (not only in Christianity, but also in Judaism and Islam) that 
takes from scripture a divinely ordained separation of the roles of the gen-
 
102 Which is why the Prince of Wales, when he married his present consort whose previous 
husband was still alive, was required to do so in a Registry Office (though the Church was, 
somewhat inconsistently, happy thereafter to offer a ceremony of blessing).  For the consti-
tutional and religious odditieVVHH6&UHWQH\³5R\DO:HGGLQJV/HJDOLW\DQGWKH5XOHRI
/DZ´)DP/DZDQG³5R\DO0DUULDJHV6RPH/HJDODQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,s-
VXHV´/45 
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ders.104  It is the male role to lead and the female role to support; the female 
role to advise and conciliate, the male role to decide and fight.  The genders 
are of equal worth, but different ± they have (it is said) complementary 
roles.  The very structure of many churches, the Roman Catholic Church 
most obviously, reflects this complementarianism and it underpins the con-
tinued opposition in the Church of England to women in leadership roles 
such as bishops.105  But it goes much further and complementarity of the 
genders in all aspects of life is part of the Catechism of the Roman Catholic 
Church.106  Applying complementarian theology to marriage allows that in-
stitution to be one that both reflects and demands different gender roles.  
Without complementarity the relationship, whatever it is, is not marriage: 
thus it is simply impossible for a relationship between two people of the 
VDPHVH[WREHD³PDUULDJH´ 
It cannot be denied that, for many long centuries, the law reflected this un-
derstanding of the essential complementarity of the genders.  Marriage in 
the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) was a relationship in which the man 
alone had legal authority to decide how, and where, the couple were to 
live107 and how, and by whom, any children were to be brought up;108 the 
ZRPDQ¶VSRVLWLRQZDVRQHRIXWWHUGHSHQGHQF\ZLWKDOOKHUSURSHUW\WUDQs-
                                                                                                                        
103 So for example the Princess Royal (sister to the Prince of Wales) chose religious cere-
mony in the Church of Scotland in order to marry her second husband, her first husband still 
being alive. 
104 See generally U. King Religion and Gender (Blackwell, 1995). 
105 Though the Church of Scotland has for some decades permitted women ministers, and 
has in recent years been headed by women, this is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Its Cal-
vinist founder, John Knox, published in 1558 the wondrously titled The First Blast of the 
Trumpet Against the Monstruous [ie unnatural] Regiment [ie rule] of Women. 
106 Catechism, 2333 ± 2335. 
107 In Scotland this rule survived until 1984: see Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scot-
land) Act 1984. 
108 Only with the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 did the various jurisdictions in the Unit-
ed Kingdom accept that the claim of the fatKHUWRFRQWURORIKLVFKLOG¶VXSEULQJLQJZDVQRW
superior to the claim of the mother. 
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ferring automatically on marriage into the name (or at least control) of her 
husband;109 the woman was (until as late as 1989110) presumed by the law to 
have given ongoing and non-UHWUDFWDEOHFRQVHQWWRKHUKXVEDQG¶VVH[XDODd-
vances (ie could not ± in law ± be raped by her husband whether or not ± in 
fact ± she was raped by him).  Traditionally marriage was a relationship 
characterised by power and dependency, with an essential complementarity 
EHWZHHQ WKHKXVEDQG¶V GXW\ RI VXSSRUW DQG WKH ZLIH¶VREOLJDWLRQ WR REH\
between male dominance and female subservience. 
However, notwithstanding this traditional acceptance of complementarity, 
the law has moved away from all of these positions and today reflects the 
social understanding that relations between the genders should be based on 
equality and partnership, not domination and dependency.  The challenge 
for traditional theologians is to explain why complementarity should con-
tinue to govern eligibility to marry (and church structures) but not anything 
else ± not even the consequences of marriage.  For complementarity, if it 
makes any sense, is an all or nothing doctrine: if marriage must retain com-
plementarity between the male head of the family and his female help-
meet,111 then so too must the whole of society and all its laws and institu-
WLRQV7RVD\³WKHVWUXFWXUHRIRXUFKXUFKDQGUXles for entry into marriage, 
UHTXLUHVPDOHOHDGHUVKLSRYHUWKHIHPDOHEXWQRWKLQJHOVHGRHV´KDVQRORJ
ic and, in truth, by delimiting the scope of complementarity concedes the 
point that male dominance - including in church governance and marriage ± 
is a social construct rather than a natural phenomenon. 
 
109 A rule gradually ameliorated by a series of statutes including, for England and Wales, 
WKH0DUULHG:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\$FWVDQGDQGIRU6FRWODQGWKH0DUried 
:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\6FRWODQG$FWVDQG 
110 S v. Lord Advocate 1989 SLT 469 (for Scotland); R v. R (Rape: Marital Exemption) 
[1991] 4 All ER 481 (for England and Wales). 
111 Genesis 2:18. 
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All social constructs change as society itself changes, and the acceptance by 
society of gender equality is, in itself, the denial of a literalist (or unchange-
able) approach to scriptural interpretation.  St Paul told the Corinthians that 
women had to be silent in church112 and this is one of the major scriptural 
bases for the doctrine that only men may take on leadership roles in reli-
JLRXV RUJDQLVDWLRQV  %XW PRGHUQ RU OLEHUDO WKHRORJ\ UHJDUGV 6W 3DXO¶V
words as doing no more than reflecting the makeup of the ancient society in 
Corinth and denies that it sets down any divinely ordained rule that must be 
applied today, and forever more.  If the genders are equal ± and modern so-
ciety, and its legal rules, strive to make that aspiration a reality ± then in nei-
ther church governance nor marriage is there a need to retain gender-
specific roles.  Traditional marriage may well have been unable to accom-
modate same-sex couples because of the inherent complementarity of its pa-
triarchal power-structure, but modern marriage, as understood (and wanted) 
by the vast majority of the population in the United Kingdom (and else-
where in the western world), as a partnership of equals, can accommodate 
same-sex couples just as easily as opposite-sex couples, and it is good social 
policy for the law, through its design of marriage, to encourage that more 
modern view of relationships.  If opening marriage to same-sex couples 
helps to remove once and for all an understanding that marriage involves a 
power-structure based on expected gender roles then that opening will have 
served a valuable social function that is justification enough for doing so. 
 
Problems with Opening Marriage 
None of the arguments currently being propounded by religious traditional-
ists, being based on scriptural truths that are not universally accepted, or are 
not universally accepted to be immutable, make much sense to a secular 
lawyer and they should have little weight with legislators committed to 
 
112 1 Corinthians 14: 34. 
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providing universal laws, applicable to all citizens, whatever form of faith 
(if any) they adhere to.  But it does not follow from the removal of religious 
precepts from the legal concept of marriage  ± as it seems to be assumed in 
the USA to follow ± that the law should provide one institution for all cou-
SOHVDQGWKDWWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVKRXOGEHFDOOHG³PDUULDJH´ 0DUULDJHWRGD\
has been designed to suit the needs of opposite-sex couples and while the 
needs of same-sex couples very substantially overlap those of their hetero-
sexual counterparts it would be wrong to assume that the issues facing each 
type of couple are identical in every respect.  It has already been accepted 
that the rules concerning sexual behaviour within the relationship (adultery, 
impotency and consummation) are uniquely suited to opposite-sex couples 
and have no (legal) relevance to same-sex couples.113  The practical issues 
facing a male couple who wish to have children are very different ± and 
demand different legal solutions ± from those facing female couples (or op-
posite-sex couples) with the same wish.  The financial consequences of mar-
riage and separation, designed primarily to address the structural economic 
imbalance in society between men and women, are not self-evidently suita-
ble when a same-sex couple, between whom financial parity is more likely, 
separate.114  The problem of forced marriages as a means of creating family 
alliances will simply not arise in relation to same-sex marriage.115 
 
 
113 6HHWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VResponses to Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003) at p. 36.  The 
UK Government has, it is true, rather retracted from that acceptance in Equal Civil Mar-
riage: A Consultation (March 2012) for it expresses an intention to apply the rules of adul-
tery and consummation to marriage involving same-sex couples, with the surely misplaced 
expectation that the courts will develop these concepts beyond their current heterosexual pa-
rameters. 
114 See IXUWKHU.1RUULH³0DUULDJH LV IRU+HWHURVH[XDOV0D\ WKH5HVWRI8V%H6DYHG
)URP,W´&)/4 
115 A fact recognised by the Scottish Parliament when it enacted the Forced Marriage etc 
(Protection and Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Act 2011 providing civil remedies to those being 
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Using marriage as the universal union for all couples also runs the risk of 
assimilating same-sex couples into bland and constraining heteronormativi-
ty.  The effect of opening marriage is, Nancy Polikoff has long argued,116 
far less socially transformative than the creation of parallel institutions (such 
as civil partnership) or a series of institutions of equal worth.  Marriage en-
sures that difference is made safe by being minimised, rather than accepted 
for what it is and celebrated.117  The powerful political alliance between gay 
rights and feminist activists, who have a common enemy in the doctrine that 
sex is legitimate only when potentially procreative, has withered as mar-
riage, previously seen by many feminists as part of the problem, comes to 
be seen in the LGBT community as the solution.  Yet the identity of the ar-
guments against advancing the rights of women and the rights of gay people 
is seen with naked clarity as the Church of England interminably debates the 
issue(s) of women bishops and gay bishops. 
 
It is in any case naïve at best to see marriage as the VROXWLRQWRVRFLHW\¶VLOOV
Even if we accept that marriage is an important stabilising influence on so-
ciety, it does not follow that it is more effective in providing that stability 
than good social welfare, parenting support, education and equal opportuni-
ties policies.  The focus on marriage as a solution is, in other words, dan-
gerously short-sighted.  Homophobic hate crimes will not disappear when 
marriage is opened to same-sex couples.  Equality and non-discrimination in 
employment and in the provision of goods and services is at least as im-
                                                                                                                        
forced into marriage but not civil partnership.  The power to extend the Act in future to civil 
partnership is included if the issue does arise, but it is assumed that it will not. 
116 ³:H:LOO*HW:KDW:H$VN)RU:K\/HJDOLVLQg Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 
'LVPDQWOHWKH/HJDO6WUXFWXUHRI*HQGHULQ(YHU\0DUULDJH´9D/5HY
Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage (Beacon Press, Boston 2008). 
117 The whole thrust of the law, both at the UK and the European level, is to extend rights 
and obligations to same-sex couples who seek to participate in traditional, nuclear family-
style relationships: see C. Stychin Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of Citizen-
ship and Law Reform (Hart, 2003). 
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portant for individual gay men and women as civil partnership and marriage 
is for same-sex couples.  The focus on marriage as a goal, in other words, 
adopts the utterly traditional approach of preferencing the couple over the 
individual, preferencing conformity over diversity.  Not for nothing did the 
%ULWLVK&RQVHUYDWLYH3ULPH0LQLVWHU'DYLG&DPHURQVD\LQ³,GRQ¶W
support gay marriage in spite of being a Conservative.  I support gay mar-
riage because I am a ConVHUYDWLYH´118 
 
Conclusion 
Marriage is likely to be opened to same-sex couples in the United Kingdom 
within a very few years of this book being published, and that will effect a 
truly remarkable transformation in the legal position of gay men and lesbi-
ans from the days of criminality, a mere generation ago.  We should not, 
however, expect too much from the opening of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples, even with its message of tolerance, respect and equality.  Opening 
marriage alone will not prevent hate speech and homophobic assault, nor 
remove individual feelings of moral superiority over those of a minority 
sexual orientation.  These things can be reduced not only by the law deem-
ing them unacceptable,119 but by society in all its manifestations accepting 
the moral equivalence of homosexuality and heterosexuality.  Today, both 
legislation and case law in the United Kingdom give out the unambiguous 
message that gay men and lesbians, and same-sex couples, pose no threat to 
the good of society, and are entitled to be accorded the respect and dignity 
that the heterosexual majority take for granted.  That message, however, 
 
118 David Cameron, MP, ³/HDGHUVKLS IRU D%HWWHU%ULWDLQ´ VSHHFK WR&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\
&RQIHUHQFH2FWREHUDYDLODEOHRQ&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\ZHEVLWH³VSHHFKHV´ 
119 6HH.*RRGDOO³&KDOOHQJLQJ+DWH6SHHFK,QFLWHPHQWWR+DWUHGRQ*URXQGVRI6H[XDO
Orientation in England, :DOHVDQG1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG´,QW-+5/LPLWDWLRQV
on free speech which prevent the distribution of leaflets that were contemptuous of and dis-
paraging towards homosexuals are not inconsistent with Art. 10 of the European Convention 
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fails to achieve complete social transformation in attitudes because the op-
posing message, that same-sex relationships hurt society and its members, 
continues to be propounded by religious traditionalists, who still feel free to 
proclaim the moral superiority of heterosexuality over homosexuality, even 
when they would hesitate to proclaim, openly, the moral superiority of 
white people over black, or the superiority of Christian people (as people) 
over Jew or Muslim ± or the superiority of the male over the female.  Anti-
semitism and racism have long since been expelled from the sphere of re-
spectable political (and indeed religious) discourse and it is today limited to 
the extreme fringes of right-wing politics.  Anti-gay sentiments are, howev-
er, not yet considered to be beyond the pale, or unacceptable in normal po-
litical discourse, almost solely because they continue to receive a legitimacy 
and a respectability from scriptural texts which religious leaders assert are 
still valid, even while they accept that other biblical injunctions (such as, for 
example, the Judeo-&KULVWLDQ *RG¶V K\VWHULFDO GHPDQGV IRU JHQRFLGH LQ
Joshua120) may, even must, be disregarded.  The message of homosexual in-
IHULRULW\SURFODLPHGIURPSXOSLWVDQGELVKRSV¶SDODFHV LVKHDUGDQGWUDQs-
lated into a message of intolerance and hatred by thugs, who then feel ag-
grieved when they are charged with hate crime as opposed to common as-
sault. 
 
Gay men and lesbians would not be the only losers if the state were to defer 
to religious (or cultural) traditionalism and allow religious beliefs to qualify 
human rights and equality norms.  The risks to women, in particular, are 
great for patriarchy is an inescapable feature of most mainstream religions 
across the world.  Giving priority to equality over religious beliefs and prac-
tices ± even when that involves the sudden subversion of many hundreds of 
                                                                                                                        
on Human Rights: Vejdeland v. Sweden (App 1813/07), 9th February 2012.  See comment at 
(2012) EHRLR 348. 
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years of social, legal and religious discrimination against sexual minorities ± 
is, therefore, the best guarantee that every citizen will be allowed to lead 
their life as a dignified human person, free to shape their life and relation-
ships according to their own nature, and with as much opportunity to exer-
cise choice as anyone else.  It is the grand purpose of the law to minimise 
UHOLJLRQ¶V SURYHQ FDSDFLW\ WR KXUW LQGLYLGXDOV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH ZKR DUH
³RWKHU´121 Preferencing equality and non-discrimination norms of gay and 
lesbian people over religious freedom is a powerful message that the state is 
willing to fulfil its duty in this regard, and is the ultimate acceptance of gen-
der equality itself. 
 
                                                                                                                        
120 Joshua 6:21 and 10:40-41. 
121 ,QFOXGLQJ RI FRXUVH WKH ³RWKHUQHVV´ RI ZRPHQ LQ 6LPRQH GH %HDXYRLU¶V VHQVH The 
Second Sex (1949). 
